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The Committee for Economic
Development is an independent research
and policy organization of over 200 business
leaders and educators. CED is non-profit,
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is
to propose policies that bring about steady
economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increased
productivity and living standards, greater and
more equal opportunity for every citizen, and
an improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is
directed under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objective
in character, and the approach in each
instance is to be from the standpoint of the
general welfare and not from that of any
special political or economic group.” The
committee is aided by a Research Advisory
Board of leading social scientists and by a
small permanent professional staff. 
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives
set forth in this statement and of the best
means of accomplishing those objectives. 
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of
memoranda. The research is undertaken by a
subcommittee, assisted by advisors chosen for
their competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove
a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privi-
lege of submitting individual comments for
publication.
The recommendations presented herein
are those of the trustee members of the
Research and Policy Committee and the
responsible subcommittee. They are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by
non-trustee subcommittee members, advisors,
contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED. 
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REDUCING GLOBAL POVERTY: 
Encouraging Private Investment in Infrastructure
PURPOSE OF THIS UPDATE
In May 2002, CED released a policy state-
ment, A Shared Future: Reducing Global
Poverty, which called on leaders of global
enterprises “to rally public and private sup-
port for a strategy to overcome global
poverty.” This policy update adds greater
background and deeper analysis to the ini-
tial policy statement with regard to the
important role potentially to be played by
private investment in infrastructure, often
through what are called public-private part-
nerships. The update calls attention to the
policy changes needed in developing coun-
tries to make such partnerships attractive to
private investors. The update explains how
the right agreements between public and
private partners can create the right incen-
tives for the private sector to invest effi-
ciently.  It also presents useful examples of
how public-private partnerships have been
successful, but also how and why they have
sometimes gone wrong.
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Greater private-sector participation in build-
ing, financing, and operating infrastructure in
developing countries can promote economic
growth and reduce global poverty. Private
infrastructure projects, often known as “pub-
lic-private partnerships,” employ private-sector
entities to supply physical infrastructure and
services in such sectors as power, telecommu-
nications, transportation, sanitation, and
water in developing countries. Often donor
agencies, such as USAID and the World Bank,
support these arrangements through financ-
ing and technical assistance. Although private
investment in developing country infrastruc-
ture is currently far below its 1997 peak, the
private sector has much to offer in both
human and financial resources and should be
part of the solution to meeting the vast 
infrastructure needs of developing countries.
TYPES OF ARRANGEMENTS
FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN
INFRASTRUCTURE:
CONTRACTS, OUTPUT-BASED
AID, AND POOLED FINANCING 
Private infrastructure contracts spell out the
public and private sectors’ duties and respon-
sibilities. Many projects have foundered
because of misunderstandings, poorly speci-
fied contracts, or a lack of execution by one
or the other or both of the contracting par-
ties. Equally important to making projects
successful, and often lacking, are the trans-
parency of decision making to combat cor-
ruption and the legal and regulatory institu-
tions that permit enforcement of contracts
and the adjudication of disputes.
Private infrastructure projects have
included innovative ideas in both finance
and implementation. Output-based aid is a
strategy whereby a public agency supports
the financing of infrastructure projects
through payments that include a subsidy
component contingent on the private con-
tractor’s achievement of specified perform-
ance targets.* This approach has great
potential to significantly increase the
amount of investment in critical infrastruc-
ture sectors in the developing world such as
water, sanitation, power and transportation.
Pooled financing is another strategy.  It aims to
overcome private-sector investors’ concerns
about the viability of individual projects by
spreading risks over a broad portfolio of
development investments.
These seemingly small innovations in
contracting, service delivery, and finance,
when taken together, can bring a sea change
in the effectiveness of development aid. By
emphasizing quantifiable goals, transparency,
and greater accountability, they can also
increase public confidence in and support for
programs to eliminate global poverty.
THE NEED FOR PRIVATE
PARTNERS:  BACKGROUND
AND TRENDS IN THE
PROVISION OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
Despite decades of investment in the infra-
structure of developing countries, the scale
of unmet needs is overwhelming. The World
Bank estimates that about 2 billion people
lack an electrical connection, 1.1 billion peo-
ple lack a safe water supply, and 2.4 billion
people lack adequate sanitation. Until the
early 1990s, infrastructure was usually pro-
vided and regulated by the public sector, and
in most developing countries, it still is. The
shift toward private sector involvement was
motivated in part by inefficiencies in the
public provision of services, including large
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* Subsidies are appropriate in some, but not all, situations.  An
advantage of output-based aid subsidies is that they generally are
tied to specific outputs.  In addition, they can be time limited.
2losses due to mismanagement, graft, and cor-
ruption, and an increasingly apparent gap
between growing national demands and
tightening budgetary constraints. An ideologi-
cal shift away from central planning and
toward freer markets also played an important
role.
Annual flows of public and private funds
invested in infrastructure projects in
developing countries rose from less than 
$13 billion in 1990 to more than $114 billion
by 1997, but have been declining since. The
East Asian financial crisis and the
macroeconomic problems in Latin America
are often cited as contributing to the decline.
Another frequently cited cause is the failure of
some high-profile, high-cost projects that have
met popular resistance. Overconfidence in
performance and underestimation of risks
also may have led to many ill-considered
projects. Ultimately, the primary, and
continuing, cause of the inadequate level of
private investment in infrastructure is the
inability of many developing-country
governments to take the necessary steps to
maintain sound economic policies, improve
governance, and eradicate corruption, and
the failure of public-sector entities in the
developing world to honor their commitments
in the face of large increases in payment
obligations that these entities either could
not—or did not have the will to—honor.
BENEFITS OF PRIVATE-SECTOR
INFRASTRUCTURE
About 95 percent of the 2900 private infra-
structure partnership projects tracked by the
World Bank are operational. World Bank
studies suggest that these projects have
improved services by adding customers,
increasing quality, and lowering costs, includ-
ing those associated with corruption. Some of
the biggest gains from private infrastructure
projects come from extending services to pre-
viously unserved populations. Efficiency
improvements resulting from private partici-
pation show cost savings in the range of 
10-30 percent. Examples of successful proj-
ects summarized in this report include
Ecuador’s water and sewage services, electri-
cal connections to rural households in
Mozambique, transportation in Chad, urban
infrastructure development in India, and
telecommunications services in Nigeria.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS
The initiative usually resides with the host
government to decide whether its goals can
be realized better through a private
infrastructure project.  Such projects can be
especially complicated and tax the resources
and abilities of host governments. The
government must not only specify the scope
of the project, performance targets, and the
compensation scheme by which the private
company will be paid, they must also assure
the private investor of sound economic and
regulatory policies, and of political stability
rarely found in developing countries.
The private-sector provider’s role is to help
finance and plan the project and, ultimately,
to deliver the goods and services. Private-sec-
tor efficiency is more likely to be achieved
with competition, especially during the bid-
ding phase of a project, and a well-drawn
contract. It is of the utmost importance that
commercial risk for project construction and
operation be transferred from the public to
the private sector for a successful private
infrastructure project. 
In turn, private-sector entities providing
infrastructure in the world’s poorest countries
will need to obtain stronger support than in
the past from creditworthy governmental enti-
ties (including the World Bank and its con-
stituent institutions and OECD governments)
to assure that if the private-sector providers of
services meet their obligations, the public-sec-
tor entities will honor their commitments to
pay the amounts agreed and to carry out their
other obligations. 
Improving efficiency and ensuring that
money is well spent are critical to a donor’s
mission. Donors see their roles as bringing
together public and private partners,
targeting funds to fill a specific financing
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gap, and helping to strike an appropriate
assignment of commercial and political risks
between the partnering parties. In order to
enhance the prospects of success for private
infrastructure projects, donors mitigate risks
by providing an assortment of guarantees
and insurance services, supply technical
assistance to client governments, and assist
these governments in developing an
incentive contract to ensure the delivery of
specified outputs and services.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The private sector has much to offer, in
both human and financial resources, but
private participation in infrastructure is not
a panacea. Private infrastructure projects
are not easy to implement. But the scale of
needs is large and the private sector must be
part of the solution to meeting those needs.
To obtain the benefits of private-sector
involvement, public administrators need to
be able to create contracts that establish the
right incentives; they need to set up well-
functioning supporting institutions; and
they need to transfer enough commercial
risk and responsibility to the private sector.
Transparency on the part of both public-
and private-sector participants is a
particularly important part of the process
because it helps create public legitimacy and
thwart corruption. And donor entities need
to provide creditworthy supporting
mechanisms to assure that if the private-
sector partners meet their commitments to
deliver essential services in the poorest
countries, the payment commitments for
these services will be met in the agreed-
upon amounts.
In many developing countries, public
support for private participation is low, in
part because of price increases for services
from newly built projects that are above
levels previously charged by governmental
providers, which often heavily subsidized
users (as in the case of provision of power
by state-owned entities in India). Host-
country governments and aid donors must
do more to overcome public resistance by
explaining the benefits of foreign
investment in infrastructure. They must also
do more to entice private-sector
participation by becoming more effective
and reliable “partners.” Profit-making firms
need the incentive of profit to induce
investment.  Developing-country
governments must increase efforts to
establish and maintain sound and stable
economic policies and to eliminate
corruption. Among the most important
actions developing countries can take are:
• To be fully transparent about all aspects of
private infrastructure projects;
• To establish sound and equitable pricing
policies; and
• To devote sufficient talent and resources to
the development of private infrastructure
project contracts and regulation.
The shared goal of raising incomes and
reducing poverty in developing countries
demands that public and private sector leaders
work as partners to improve the quantity and
quality of vital infrastructure projects.
4CED often has extolled the virtues of pri-
vate-sector enterprise as the engine of eco-
nomic growth and development. The evi-
dence in favor of it is incontrovertible. Our
2002 policy statement, A Shared Future:
Reducing Global Poverty, recommended various
steps for encouraging private-sector (both
domestic and foreign) investment in develop-
ing countries. In that report, we recom-
mended that U.S. business and other private-
sector leaders rally public and private sup-
port for a strategy to overcome global
poverty, that the U.S. Government remove
tariffs, quotas and subsidies that impede
developing-country exports, and that the
United States increase development assis-
tance and deliver it more effectively through
public-private partnerships. Such partner-
ships would provide a more effective model
of development assistance in which the busi-
ness community would play a key role in
building capabilities, transferring expertise,
and delivering services. 
Those recommendations were addressed
to U.S. business, educational and political
leaders, the international aid agencies, and
the developing countries themselves. CED’s
recommendations stress that economic
growth is central to raising incomes and
reducing poverty, and that developing coun-
try governments must demonstrate the polit-
ical will to make sustainable economic
growth and poverty reduction the highest
priorities and to carry out a strategy to that
end. Such a strategy must include a mean-
ingful commitment to curb corruption. In
follow-on reports we explored in greater
depth how enhancing the role of women in
development and engaging global enter-
prises to undertake social initiatives can
boost economic development.  
Much has happened in the period between
the publication of our earlier report and this
one. Our goals, however, remain the same: to
mobilize private- and public-sector leaders to
take the necessary steps to promote
economic growth and reduce poverty in
developing countries.
This report focuses on one of our recom-
mendations for reducing poverty, namely the
encouragement of enterprises commonly
called “public-private partnerships” focused
on infrastructure activities such as the deliv-
ery of water, sanitation, power, transporta-
tion, health care and education. Ideally, such
enterprises combine the relevant strengths of
each private sector and public sector partner
to provide a public benefit—in this connec-
tion, to expand and improve the delivery of
critical services over a period of years to ben-
efit the world’s poorest people. Successful
partnerships can help consolidate and build
public support for programs that address
global poverty.
The term public-private partnership is used
by development experts to describe a broad
array of relationships, some commercial and
some non-commercial, ranging from private
charitable giving to address social needs to
privatization of state-owned commercial
enterprises. Here we focus on a narrower set
of arrangements by which developing coun-
try governments harness the productive
capacity of private businesses, mostly from
more mature economies but also from
“We support the formation of public-private
partnerships in developing countries to
achieve carefully articulated and specific
outcomes, such as building institutional
capabilities, transferring technical expertise,
and delivering critical services.”
Source: CED, A Shared Future: Reducing Global Poverty
(Washington, DC: CED, 2002), p. 4.
INTRODUCTION
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domestic and regional enterprises, to supply
physical infrastructure and services (tradi-
tionally provided by the governments them-
selves) in such critical areas as power,
telecommunications, transportation, sanita-
tion, and water. Often, national or multina-
tional organizations such as USAID and the
World Bank finance and broker the arrange-
ments. The purpose is to enhance and
expand the delivery of basic services by mobi-
lizing private capital and employing develop-
ment resources more efficiently. Although
such arrangements are generally referred to
as public-private partnerships, at their core,
for private companies, they are simply
another form of business investment, and
this report views them from this perspective.
In this report we emphasize the role private
resources—capital, technology, industry
know-how, management skills, and marketing
abilities—can play in the provision of serv-
ices usually associated with physical infra-
structure. The advanced economies have
come a long way in placing responsibility for
such services in the private sector and have
shown a path for developing economies to
shift ownership and responsibility for infra-
structure services (especially airlines, rail-
roads, telecommunications, and electrical
power) from the public to the private sector.
Developing countries need to commit to poli-
cies that would attract private resources; most
such countries will attract a significant
increase in investment capital if they do so.
Still, experience suggests that the path to
private-sector development and financing of
new facilities is unlikely to be smooth. It will
not be easy for developing country govern-
ments to create the conditions necessary for
projects to realize their potential. And, pri-
vate participation in infrastructure will not
automatically turn developing nations into
advanced economies. Nevertheless, the
shared goal of raising incomes and reducing
poverty in developing countries demands
that public and private sector leaders work
as partners to improve the quantity and
quality of vital infrastructure services. There
are enough success stories and sufficient
indicators to show that, if done correctly,
private investment in developing country
infrastructure can directly alleviate condi-
tions of poverty and help spur economic
growth.
6Some efforts to promote private-sector
involvement in infrastructure have similari-
ties to traditional public contracting, where
government engages a private company to
build an infrastructure facility, such as a
highway, which then is transferred to the
government “owner” upon completion. But
such contracts typically do not call for signifi-
cant private investment. More innovative pri-
vate infrastructure projects require the com-
mitment of private capital and draw on the
strengths of the private sector to shoulder a
broader set of responsibilities. Under a typi-
cal arrangement, the government specifies
the desired outcome, and the private com-
pany designs, builds, finances, and operates
a facility to achieve that outcome. (The ini-
tiative also can come from the private sec-
tor.)  In such projects the private company
has a greater stake in the project’s long-term
success; they do not walk away from the proj-
ect after it is built. Private infrastructure proj-
ects, often described as partnerships, involve
contracts that spell out each partner’s duties
and responsibilities. Experience shows that
the structure and terms of the contract are
critical to a project’s success. Equally impor-
tant, and often lacking, are the transparency
of decision making to combat corruption,
and the legal and regulatory institutions that
permit enforcement of contracts and the
adjudication of disputes. 
Private infrastructure projects have
included innovative ideas in both finance
and implementation. One such innovation
has been the use of so-called “output-based
aid”(OBA) in which a public agency makes
payments, which include a subsidy
component, contingent on the private
contractor’s achievement of performance
targets on the quality and quantity of service
in specific geographic areas. (See Box 1.)
Where competition exists among prospective
operators, output-based aid subsidies can be
WHAT IS NEW IN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN
INFRASTRUCTURE
“Output-Based Aid (OBA) is a strategy for using
explicit performance-based subsidies to support the
delivery of basic services where policy concerns would
justify public funding to complement or replace user-
fees. Affordability concerns for particular groups of
users, positive externalities, or the infeasibility of
imposing direct user-fees represent examples of the
types of policy concerns that have motivated govern-
ments to use public funds to support the delivery of
basic services.”2
In essence, OBA combines the use of performance
contracts with explicit government subsidies to deliver
basic services—such as water, sanitation, electricity,
transport, telecommunications, education, and health
care—more efficiently to those in most need. OBA
projects increase accountability for performance and,
ideally, allow the subsidy payments to be phased out
over time. The approach is performance-based
because it links payment to the delivery of specified
services or outputs, which transfers performance risk
to the service provider. The provider must put its own
capital at risk by  self-financing the project until after
the successful delivery is verified, usually by a third
party, after which the provider receives
reimbursement. By contrast, in a typical non-OBA
project, the provider is paid up front for the delivery
of an established investment project, rather than the
achievement of the desired output from that project.  
Competition is an important element of OBA proj-
ects. Bidding for contracts creates competitive pres-
sure, increases public confidence in the legitimacy of
the service provider, and can dramatically reduce total
subsidy requirements. Non-exclusive contracts, where
possible, encourage direct competition. Performance
criteria that measure relative accomplishments
against a baseline also may be built into OBA con-
tracts. Because residual revenues belong to the
provider, OBA provides motivation to reduce costs.
Re-auctioning or re-negotiating contracts after an ini-
tial period may allow the subsidy to shrink based on
the provider’s experience. 
Sources: Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid and
the World Bank
Box 1. Output-Based Aid 
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awarded on the basis of the lowest subsidy
required to meet output targets.
Another innovative arrangement is pooled
financing, viewed by some as “the next gener-
ation of infrastructure finance.”1 By spread-
ing risks over a broad portfolio of develop-
ment investments, pooled financing aims to
overcome private-sector investor concerns
about the viability of individual projects.
Also, it splits the private-sector role into two
parts, allowing for greater specialization and
efficiency in each. One part allows financial
engineers, working with host governments
and donor agencies, to attract foreign finan-
cial capital by mitigating risks. The other part
takes advantage of private-sector partners in
designing, building and operating infrastruc-
ture projects. The concept is derived from
the U.S. model of state revolving funds
(SRFs), which were established in 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act
(CWA).* In the developing country context,
a donor could help capitalize a revolving
fund with a grant or long-term loan, and it
could offer to guarantee a portion of the
fund’s losses due to defaults. Although
pooled financing is a passive form of partner-
ship, it holds substantial promise of drawing
in much needed private-sector funds.  
Significantly, OBA and pooled financing
shift the emphasis for development aid agen-
cies from a focus on engineering questions—
how to build a water sanitation system—to
financial questions—how to secure adequate
funding by paying for performance, crafting
market-based incentives, and minimizing risks.  
These seemingly small innovations in serv-
ice delivery, contracting, and finance, when
taken together, can bring a sea change in the
effectiveness of development aid. They hold
substantial potential for providing the basic
services and infrastructure critical for devel-
opment. At the same time, by emphasizing
quantifiable goals, transparency, and greater
accountability, they can also increase public
confidence in and support for programs to
reduce global poverty.  
We examine these various aspects of private
infrastructure projects in further detail below.
* An SRF is a revolving fund established with an initial capital-
ization grant.  SRF loans to finance infrastructure projects are
paid back with taxes, user fees, grants, or loans from other
institutions. As loans are repaid, capital is freed for new loans.  
8Despite decades of investment in the infra-
structure of developing countries, the scale
of unmet needs is overwhelming. The World
Bank estimates that about 2 billion people
lack an electrical connection, 1.1 billion peo-
ple lack a safe water supply, and 2.4 billion
people lack adequate sanitation.3 The annual
requirement for infrastructure financing is
estimated to be about $500 billion, or about
7 percent of GDP for all developing coun-
tries. While the World Bank has recently
been shifting some funding towards infra-
structure, that shift will not be enough to fill
the financing gap. In the 1990s, when invest-
ment was historically high, about 8 percent of
infrastructure investment was financed by
official development assistance, 22 percent
came from the private sector, and self-financ-
ing from developing countries amounted to
about 70 percent.4
Private-sector provision of public services is
a relatively new phenomenon in developing
countries, but the amount of capital poten-
tially available for investment swamps the
funds that could be provided by development
aid agencies. Until the early 1990s, infrastruc-
ture was usually provided and regulated by
the public sector, and in most developing
countries it still is. The shift toward private-
sector involvement was motivated in part by
inefficiencies in the public provision of serv-
ices, including large losses due to misman-
agement, graft, and corruption, and an
increasingly apparent gap between growing
national demands and tightening budgetary
constraints. An ideological change away from
central planning and toward freer markets
has added to the shift.
Trends in Private-Sector Infrastructure
Investment
Between 1990 and 2004, a total of $865.8
billion in public and private funds was
invested in over 2900 public-private infra-
structure projects in developing countries.
Annual flows rose from less than $13 billion
in 1990 to more than $114 billion by 1997,
but have been declining since. (See Chart 1.)
Slightly less than two-thirds of the total num-
ber of projects have been located in Latin
America and East Asia, primarily in Brazil
and China.  Investment flows have favored
upper-middle-income countries, although
flows to low-income and lower-middle-
income countries increased in 2004.
The World Bank identifies four types of
infrastructure projects with private participa-
tion: 1) divestiture, 2) management and lease
contracts, 3) concessions (or management
and operation contracts with major private
capital expenditure), and 4) greenfield proj-
ects.5 The differences among the categories
are somewhat arbitrary; all combine manage-
ment expertise with capital investment in
varying degrees.  
• Management and lease contracts, in which
a private entity takes over the management
of a state-owned enterprise, are a
traditional form of private participation.
They do not involve significant equity
participation, and they represent a small
part of the value of investment in private
infrastructure projects.  
• By contrast, in a divestiture, or other form
of privatization, a private entity buys the
equity of a state-owned enterprise and
manages it as a private entity. Investment
in divestitures peaked in 1998 at $49.4
billion, and by 2004 had fallen to less than
10 percent of that level.
THE NEED FOR PRIVATE PARTNERS:
BACKGROUND AND TRENDS IN THE PROVISION
OF INTRASTRUCTURE
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• In a concession, a private entity takes over
the management of a state-owned enter-
prise, plus construction, rehabilitation, and
operation of facilities. The concessionaire
assumes significant investment risk for a set
period. Concessions tend to be concen-
trated in transportation and water and san-
itation, and more than half of concession
projects have been in Latin America.
Investment in concessions also fell by 
90 percent, from $27.5 billion in 1997 to
$2.7 billion in 2004.  
• Greenfield projects are those in which a
private entity or a public-private joint ven-
ture builds and operates a new facility. In
some cases, at the end of a defined period,
the facility may be turned over to the pub-
lic sector.  Greenfield projects in which the
private sector is a major investor are most
commonly found in energy and telecom-
munications, and have been the most sta-
ble form of investment, as measured by
dollar value, until falling off in 2004.
The decline in private investment since
1997 (see Chart 1) has been attributed to
several factors (some are analyzed in more
detail below). The East Asian financial crisis
and macroeconomic problems in Latin
America are often cited as contributing to
the decline. Another frequently cited cause is
the failure of some high-profile, high-cost
projects that have met popular resistance.
Overconfidence in performance and
underestimation of risks may also have led
to many ill-considered projects. Frequent
contract renegotiations, and even outright
cancellations, are indicative of discontent
between public and private partners, and
such events early on may have deterred
some additional investment.6 Further, in
many countries the same basic qualities that
tend to attract private investment, including
transparency, the rule of law, and respect for
international arbitration, have often been
missing. To attract private investment,
developing countries must provide the
necessary judicial institutions to support
enforcement of contracts and arbitral
awards in a corruption-free environment.
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Ultimately, the primary, and continuing,
cause of the lack of private investment must
be the inability of many developing-country
governments to take the necessary steps to
maintain sound economic policies, improve
governance, and eradicate corruption, and
the failure of public-sector entities in the
developing world to honor their commit-
ments in the face of large increases in pay-
ment obligations that these entities either
could not—or did not have the will to—
honor.
Benefits of Private-Sector Infrastructure
About 95 percent of the 2900 private
infrastructure partnership projects tracked
by the World Bank are operational. World
Bank studies suggest that these projects have
improved services by adding customers,
increasing quality, and lowering costs,
including costs associated with corruption.
Some of the biggest gains from private
infrastructure projects come from extending
services to previously unserved populations.
Studies on private participation in water find
a 5-35 percent increase in access following
private-sector participation.7 In Bolivia, cities
that included private participation in
sewerage saw a coverage increase of more
than 50 percent by 2001 compared to cities
without private participation.8
Efficiency improvements resulting from pri-
vate participation in infrastructure projects
show costs savings in the range of 10-30 per-
cent.9 Efficiency gains are attributed to
improved management, the reduction of
duplicative costs, and reduced corruption.
Of these, improved management appears to
be the most enduring. Reducing duplicative
costs by laying off unneeded workers in priva-
tized entities previously owned by govern-
ment produces a saving to the privatized
entity, although not necessarily to the
national economy, at least in the short term.
However, such layoffs have made privatiza-
tion of existing infrastructure companies and
projects politically unpopular. The reduction
in petty corruption is well documented and
has the benefit of allowing the private entity
to keep more of its revenue rather than hav-
ing it diverted by employees to their own
pockets. However, opportunities for other
forms of corruption—for example in the
award of contracts—may offset some of these
gains.10
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Infrastructure projects take many forms,
but they generally share two characteristics:
1) they operate in the context of positive
externalities or a “natural monopoly,” and 
2) they are not commercially viable without
public-sector involvement and support.*  
A special case, perhaps the exception that
proves the rule, occurs in mobile telecommu-
nications. Before mobile telephony, telecom-
munications services based on land lines typi-
cally were provided by a single company, usu-
ally publicly owned. New technology, leading
to mobile phones, has broken the need for a
public monopoly to provide the infrastructure
for telecommunications. Allowing competition
from private mobile-telephone providers has
created the opportunity for a vast increase in
the numbers of users of such services.
Some examples will illustrate the benefits
and risks of private participation in
infrastructure.
Risk Mitigation in Ecuador’s Water &
Sewerage Concession
Guayaquil is Ecuador’s main industrial hub
and has the country’s largest urban concen-
tration. The city’s water and sewerage net-
work, which services only about 63 percent of
residents, is overburdened by a growing pop-
ulation, which is exacerbated by migratory
influx from nearby rural communities.
In August 2001, when losses of water pro-
vided by the public sector (through leaks,
theft, and other causes) climbed to 80 per-
cent, the public water and sewerage oversight
agency—ECPAG—auctioned a 30-year con-
cession for upgrading, managing and operat-
ing public water and sewerage assets. The
contract required the company to bear the
investment risk for upgrades and expanded
service while meeting minimum quality and
expansion targets. In the first five years of the
concession, the contract requires 55,238 new
water and sewerage connections in low-
income areas. The contract required a bond
from the private-sector entity as collateral for
meeting these targets. The winning company,
the Netherlands-based International Water
Service, has a 15-year guarantee on both its
equity participation and against wrongful
seizure of the bond by the government.
These guarantees played a crucial role in get-
ting the project off the ground. So far, utiliz-
ing a progressive government subsidy
scheme, the company has decreased leaks by
6 percent, expanded services and cut water
costs in half for low-income households.
Providing Electricity Connections to Rural
Households in Mozambique
Mozambique has a per capita income of
$210, and fewer than 6 percent of house-
holds are connected to the main electricity
grid, which is operated by the national utility.
The government signed a concession con-
tract in 2004 with an international consor-
tium to supply electricity to the rural area of
Inhambane province, which is cut off from
the grid. Before the contract, electricity in
the area was generated using diesel oil or gas
from a nearby gas field. Local power systems
were operated by a private company under a
management contract that provided little
incentive for improved collection rates, con-
necting new customers, or other service
improvements. The central government was
responsible for new investment, which was
mostly not forthcoming.  
The concession contract, which was let by
competitive bidding, granted the operator a
monopoly to generate, distribute, and sell
electricity within a specific geographic
region, and to set tariffs within certain limits.
Although the winning bid set a tariff slightly
higher than previous rates, the community
agreed that the increase was a fair exchange
EXAMPLES OF PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
* Externalities are spillover effects that are not captured by
markets. Governments provide infrastructure because the
spillover effects are positive and under-produced by the pri-
vate sector. Infrastructure also typically involves a natural
monopoly, where economies of scale are important--usually
the fixed costs of building a facility are high and the marginal
cost of operating it are low.  Large-scale physical networks,
such as roads and water systems typically are expensive to
build and difficult to finance through market-based prices.
They also exhibit positive externalities because of the role they
play in facilitating commerce.
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for better and more extensive service.  The
operator will receive a subsidy of $400 for
each new residential connection it makes.
No subsidy is provided for business connec-
tions. Payment of the subsidy, which is
financed through a World Bank (IDA) credit,
is contingent on physical verification of the
connection by an independent engineer.  
Improving Roads in Chad Using 
Output-Based Aid11
Chad’s annual per capita income in 2004 was
$250. The environment is harsh, and the pop-
ulation is scattered. Chad’s primary road net-
work consists of about 6,200 kilometers of
roads, only about 10 percent of which is paved.
The government of Chad has contracted
for private-sector provision of road mainte-
nance since 1994. Such contracts were based
on a traditional public works model that
lacked performance incentives beyond basic
execution. In 2001, the government, with
World Bank assistance, awarded a perform-
ance-based contract for the management and
maintenance of roads to a French company.
The company bears all responsibility for
designing, scheduling, and carrying out the
work. The contract provides direct payment
and explicit subsidies to the company for
meeting defined performance outputs keyed
to rehabilitation, maintenance, and manage-
ment of specified roads. To date, the com-
pany has complied with and exceeded service
quality requirements. The roads are judged
to be in excellent condition and users say
they are satisfied. The World Bank attributes
at least some of the success to a well-designed
contract. The contract is expected to result in
long-term capital-cost savings. Improved man-
agement and maintenance motivated the
government to allocate more dedicated tax
revenues to roads and may allow the financ-
ing of roads to become self-sustaining.  Based
on these and other assessments, the World
Bank is initiating similar projects in nearby
African countries, including Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Madagascar, and Tanzania.
Despite this success, recent developments
have thrown into question the future of this
project in Chad. Following the passage of the
Petroleum Revenue Management Law by the
Chadian government in 1999, World Bank
entities financed or guaranteed $192.9 mil-
lion to help construct a 650-mile oil pipeline
between Chad and Cameroon. The provision
of these monies by the World Bank was con-
tingent on Chad devoting the majority of the
revenue from the pipeline to sectors that
reduce poverty and improve the living stan-
dards of its people. At the end of 2005, the
Chadian government approved changes to
the Petroleum Revenue Management Law
that will allow revenues to be shifted to a
wider group of sectors, including security and
territorial administration. More alarming, the
enacted changes double to 30 percent the
amount of money that can be spent with no
oversight whatsoever. Given the clear viola-
tion of the contract on which the loan was
based and Chad’s long history of corruption,
the World Bank announced in January 2006
that it would withhold all new loans and
grants to the government of Chad and sus-
pend the disbursement of International
Development Association funds.        
Innovative Private Finance for Urban
Infrastructure in Tamil Nadu, India
Tamil Nadu is a densely populated, highly
urbanized state of India. Only 30 percent of
the state’s 27 million urban dwellers have suf-
ficient access to drinking water. Less than 40
percent of urban households have direct con-
nections to water. Only 16 percent of urban
local bodies (ULBs)—relatively small local
government entities (there are over 700 in
Tamil Nadu)—have a sewerage system. Less
than 50 percent of roads have storm water
drains.12
The Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund
(TNUDF), established in 1996, is managed
by a joint public-private venture that is major-
ity owned by the private sector. TNUDF raises
funds for urban development projects in the
region. Fourteen ULBs participate in the
Fund. In general, ULBs are considered by
commercial lenders to be too small and unre-
liable to be creditworthy on their own.
13
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Under a USAID program, TNUDF pooled
together the ULBs and sold bonds on the
domestic capital market, which will be repaid
with taxes and user fees from various infra-
structure projects. The bonds are partly
backed by a reserve fund from the state and a
50 percent guarantee from USAID.  This pro-
gram has raised more than $6.4 million from
the private sector. 
Competition in Telecommunications Services
in Nigeria
At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
Nigeria’s telecommunication system was
hopelessly out of date, extremely limited in
scope, and prohibitively expensive for the
vast majority of citizens, 70 percent of whom
survived on less than $1 a day.13 In 2001, only
one national telephone network and one cel-
lular telephone provider operated in Nigeria,
Nigerian Telecommunication Limited
(NITEL) and Nigeria Mobile
Telecommunication Limited (M-Tel), respec-
tively.  These two quasi-monopolies had very
limited capacity, and several areas of the
country had no phone service at all.14
With the aid of a revised charter that per-
mitted competition within the telecommuni-
cations sector, the Nigerian Communications
Commission developed a licensing system,
which would allow the nation to benefit from
the global developments and advancements
in information technology and the reduced
costs stemming from competition among
providers.15 Initially, four digital mobile
phone licenses—one guaranteed jointly to
NITEL and M-Tel—were offered in 2001 in
an international auction lauded by observers
as transparent and absent of corruption and
political interference. As the Nigerian
telecommunications market expanded over
the next several years, the NCC offered addi-
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tional mobile and fixed telephone licenses, as
well as Internet and satellite service licenses.  
Over the last six years, Nigeria’s telephone
and Internet systems have undergone a star-
tling transformation. By 2004, 28 fixed and
cellular telephone service providers were
operating in Nigeria, and 90 different com-
panies were providing Internet and/or satel-
lite network services.16 Between 1998 and
2004, the number of fixed telephone lines
increased from 450,000 lines to over
1,027,000 lines. The number of cellular
phone lines in Nigeria experienced an even
more spectacular jump of 26,112 percent,
from 35,000 in 1998 to 9,174,000 at the end
of 2004.17 (See figure.)  While rapid techno-
logical advances occurred during these years,
they cannot solely account for the dramatic
expansion of the Nigerian telecommunica-
tions industry.  During the same time period,
Western Europe and the United States
reported 279 percent and 163 percent
increases in the number of mobile phone
lines, respectively.18 
As an ever increasing number of compa-
nies vied for market shares, the price of tele-
phone and Internet service in Nigeria
dropped significantly, placing it within the
grasp of a larger segment of the population.
The cost of a mobile phone starter package
decreased from $145 in 2001 to less than one
cent in 2004. The cost of internet access
dropped more than 80 percent between 1999
and 2004, to 70 cents per hour. While the
majority of users are concentrated in urban
areas, Nigeria is currently working to increase
telecommunications access in rural areas
through two projects: Rural Telephony and
Wire Nigeria.19
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Experience with private investments in
infrastructure has been mixed. Evaluations
indicate that many projects founder amid
accusations of broken promises by one or
another of the public and private partners.
And, as noted above, this experience has
diminished enthusiasm for new agreements,
notably among key public and private-sector
participants. Nevertheless, aid donors and
anti-poverty advocates, including CED, see the
opportunity for adjustments—learning from
past mistakes—that would justify broader sup-
port for private infrastructure arrangements.
In this section we examine how each of the
participants—local government, private-sec-
tor provider, and aid donor—is expected to
perform and the extent to which expectations
match experience. In the next section we
examine proposals for change.
The Public Sector in Developing Countries 
In principle, private infrastructure projects
start with the host country’s development
objectives, which are usually incorporated
into a national development plan or, for low-
income countries, a World Bank-IMF Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).* Because
of the complexity and political sensitivity of
most infrastructure projects, they may go
through several years of preparation and
negotiation before a contract, typically of a
long duration such as 30 years, is signed, and
the project is ready to get underway.
The initiative clearly resides with the host
government—national, regional or local—
which must decide whether its goals can be
realized better through a private infrastruc-
ture project, a more traditional procurement
contract, or a wholly public enterprise.  It
must also have the will to commit to estab-
lishing an environment conducive to business
investment.
At a practical level, the government must
specify the scope of the project, performance
targets and the compensation scheme by
which the private company will be paid.
Payment schemes have moved away from
traditional forms of public-utility regulation,
which were keyed to a rate of return on input
costs or to price caps. Now, they focus greater
attention on provider incentives and on
output-based measures of accomplishment.  
Private infrastructure projects often require
the host government to undertake policy
changes or guarantee certain conditions
deemed necessary for the project to be suc-
cessful. Such changes may include legislation
to grant certain needed authorities to either
the private enterprise or the public-sector
entity overseeing it, such as creating the legal
authority for the private company to operate,
or authorizing taxing or regulatory authority
for the government. They may require build-
ing of complementary infrastructure, reform-
ing contracting procedures or other regula-
tions, or taking various other actions to
ensure the success of the project.  Private
companies in unsuccessful projects often
accuse the public sector of failing to fulfill
promised commitments, and such claims are
supported by ample evidence in many of the
most visible failures.  
Evaluations of private infrastructure proj-
ects suggest that projects sometimes demand
more from the public-sector government
than it can deliver. That is, they require the
kinds of technical acumen, sound economic
and regulatory policies, and political stability
rarely found in developing countries.  On the
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS
* “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) describe a coun-
try's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and pro-
grams to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associ-
ated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by govern-
ments through a participatory process involving civil society
and development partners, including the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).”  See  <http://web.world-
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/
EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:384207~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~
theSitePK:384201,00.html> .
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human-resource side, private infrastructure
projects put strong demands on the capabili-
ties of government managers and technicians
to plan complex undertakings, taking into
account the effects of various incentives on
contractor and customer behavior, and to
regulate private economic activity in the pub-
lic interest. In the political arena, govern-
ments may be unable initially to carry
through on promised reforms or, later, to
withstand the pressure to roll back such criti-
cal but unpopular policies as setting prices
high enough to recover full costs. They may
be unable to maintain macroeconomic and
exchange-rate stability, upon which a project’s
success may rest.
Another criticism of public-sector behavior
focuses on fiscal incentives. Private infrastruc-
ture projects may be especially attractive to a
government with a constrained budget for
capital expenditures. Because most of the
costs of a private infrastructure project are
nominally borne by the private entity and
spread over the life of the project, public-sec-
tor expenditures may appear to be reduced.
Such an arrangement is valid when private-
sector funds are at risk and additional to pub-
lic-sector funds. However, to the extent the
government guarantees or underwrites the
private capital, it undermines the notion that
such capital is truly additional, and the
appearance of a reduced public-sector role
may be false. The fiscal effect of a govern-
ment guarantee or, put another way, a riskless
investment is the same as expanding the pub-
lic budget.20 Profit guarantees also encourage
private-sector financing for ill-considered
projects that can be costly to the public.*  
Private Sector—Foreign and Domestic 
The role of the private-sector provider is to
help finance and plan the project and, ulti-
mately, to deliver the goods and services.
With a well-established contract and a known
set of incentives, the private company can be
expected to mobilize resources efficiently to
produce the output demanded of it. Of
course, like all for-profit enterprises, the 
private-sector company will seek to earn a
return on its investment.
Both theory and experience point to the
importance of competition as a basis for pri-
vate-sector efficiency and to well-drawn con-
tracts as a means for channeling incentives
toward the achievement of specified goals.21
Project evaluations show that competition,
especially during the bidding phase of a proj-
ect, is a key factor in lowering costs. The
scope for competition in service delivery is
often limited because of the “publicness” of a
project, where the service may be a natural
monopoly or have externalities that cause
private providers to underproduce relative to
the social optimum. In sectors where exter-
nalities may be less important and technol-
ogy enables multiple providers, such as (wire-
less) telecommunications, opportunities for
service competition may be more abundant,
and evaluations suggest that such projects do
tend to have more competition. (See, for
example, the Nigerian case presented above.)
Contracts are important because they estab-
lish the extent to which private-sector capital
will be at risk, the latitude managers will have
for innovation, and the incentives they will
have to meet (or avoid) performance goals.
Poorly written contracts can lead private-sec-
tor managers to cut output or quality in
order to maximize private rather than public
gain. Good contracts, however, do not guar-
antee good results. In some cases, companies
have overestimated market prospects or
underestimated commercial and political
risks.22 As noted earlier, one thing upon
which analyses of private infrastructure proj-
ects agree is the importance of transferring
commercial risk from the public to the pri-
vate sector.  Results are poorest where such
risks are not transferred, and the economic
gains are greatest where risks are transferred.  
Political risks are also important, and such
risks take various forms. For one, critics often
blame the private company for such perceived
negative effects as the introduction of higher
prices to recover costs, the impacts of higher
* A Mexican toll-roads program, for example, cost tax payers
more than $7 billion, and some analysts credit this cost to the
profit guarantee aspects of the program.
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costs on lower-income populations, and envi-
ronmental degradation that may accompany a
large infrastructure project, even though such
effects may be intrinsic to the project and
unrelated to the type of entity running it.
Nevertheless, private providers make easy tar-
gets for political agitation, especially when
they are involved in such politically sensitive
areas as the distribution of clean water. 
(See Box 2.)
Of course, private entities do indeed some-
times contribute to negative political effects,
even when companies take actions within
their contracted rights—such as shut-offs for
non-payment. Companies have also been
accused of strategic bidding to win contracts
with low bids, only to renegotiate more favor-
able terms later.* Such actions, and others,
have at times exacerbated domestic political
tensions.  
Political risks take other forms as well.
Companies may misestimate the govern-
ment’s ability to fulfill promises and expecta-
tions, such as the maintenance of macroeco-
nomic and exchange-rate stability. Such mis-
calculations have caused some companies to
sustain substantial economic losses. As an
example, SUEZ, an international industrial
and services company based in France,
announced in September 2005 that it was
withdrawing from its water concession in
Argentina, known as Aguas Argentinas. The
concession, which was signed as a 30-year
contract in 1993, supplies water and sanita-
tion services to more than 10 million people
in Buenos Aires. SUEZ’s decision resulted
from a dispute that arose during Argentina’s
2001 financial crisis. At that time, the gov-
ernment froze the utility’s tariffs and con-
verted them from U.S. dollars into pesos,
which made the company’s contracts
unprofitable.  By 2002, SUEZ had already
written off losses of $870 million from its
investment in Aguas Argentinas.26 Such
experiences have, of course, weakened the
private sector’s enthusiasm for infrastructure
projects and underscore the need for new
Box 2.  The Politics of Water
Access to safe water and sanitation is essential to
reducing global poverty.  It is a fundamental health
issue. The UN reports that at least 2 million people,
mostly children, die annually from water-borne
diseases. An additional 8 million deaths of children
were linked to unsafe water and lack of sanitation,
because water-borne diseases reduced their ability to
fight infections.23
Many developing country governments have turned
to private providers of water services—safe drinking
water and sewerage services—in an effort to
overcome their own inability to provide such services.
In many cases, private providers are better equipped,
in human and financial resources, and better
motivated than their public-sector counterparts. But
civil protests against water privatization projects are
common, and sometimes violent.  
Protests have clearly had an effect in causing private
providers to become less interested in developing
country water projects. Investments in water and
sewerage projects fell from a peak of $9.7 billion in
1997 to $0.8 billion in 2003. By December 2003,
projects accounting for 40 percent of total investment
were cancelled or under international arbitration.  
Activists have framed the issue of access to water as a
“basic human right” and have opposed the
participation of private commercial firms, which
operate through market, and profit, incentives. (In
turn, private-sector suppliers have countered that the
water they supply is free; the charge is for the water
treatment and delivery.) Protestors also focus on price
increases that frequently coincide with privatization.
Such price increases cause current users to pay more
for water than they did before, but they also make
water connections available to users who previously
had no connection. Unconnected users typically pay
much more to access lower quality water than they
would be able to get under the privatization project.    
The cancellation of the Cochabamba water concession
in Bolivia provides an instructive example. The
concession started in October 1999 and was terminated
by the government within six months, in April 2000,
after violent protests, which were heralded as a “major
popular victory against the forces of globalization.”24
However, water service there has not improved and the
urban poor who would have gained from the project
have been denied its benefits. Water is available only 4
hours per day and the proportion of households
connected to the water network has fallen.25 * In practice, it is often difficult to determine when renegotia-
tions might be justifiable because of unpredictable events or
factors outside the control of the company.
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policies under which multilateral agencies
(such as the World Bank) and OECD gov-
ernmental agencies will help support the
payment obligations of local governmental
entities in order to induce investment by the
private sector in the poorest countries for
critical services such as clean water, sanita-
tion, transportation, power, health care and
education.
Aid Donors
The appeal of private infrastructure projects
to donors comes from a variety of sources.
Primarily, donors see the potential for private
infrastructure to improve the efficiency of aid
resources and contribute significantly to the
growth and development of client countries.
Improving efficiency and ensuring that
money is well spent are critical not only to the
donor’s mission but also to building public
support for development targets, such as the
UN Millennium Development Goals. And
although donors generally have a poor record
of supporting the private sector, they are
increasingly looking for help from business to
meet development goals.  
In the United States and other donor coun-
tries, channeling aid through the private sector
may lift support for aid goals and programs by
taxpayers who are distrustful of government
spending and concerned that public funds are
being siphoned off by bribery and corruption
in recipient countries. Taxpayers may feel reas-
sured that aid money is being well spent if it is
entrusted to known companies that have a
stake in delivering verifiable outputs. Although
employing private contractors cannot assure
the elimination of corruption, shifting to pri-
vate providers typically creates more trans-
parency at the bidding stage, where corruption
involving private companies is most likely to
occur, in contrast to the pervasive bribery and
outright theft that occurs lower down the
chain in less observable transactions in many
public-sector enterprises. 
Donors also like the ability to leverage their
money by attracting private capital to supple-
ment development resources and private
management to extend existing resources by
using them more efficiently.  
Donors see their roles as bringing
together public and private partners, provid-
ing “gap” financing, and helping to strike an
appropriate assignment of commercial and
political risks between the partnering par-
ties.27 They have identified three primary
channels by which development assistance
can be used to enhance the prospects for pri-
vate infrastructure projects: risk mitigation,
technical assistance, and output-based aid.28
Risk mitigation can take several forms, and
donors provide an assortment of guarantees
and insurance services aimed at encouraging
private-sector trade and investment. The IFC,
a member of the World Bank Group, pro-
vides loan and equity financing for private-
sector projects in developing countries. It
also helps private companies in developing
countries to obtain financing in international
financial markets. In addition, it provides
advice and technical assistance to businesses
and governments. 
Another member of the World Bank
Group, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), provides politi-
cal risk insurance, which guarantees against
currency inconvertibility, expropriation, war
and civil disturbances, and breach of con-
tract. It and other agencies also provide dis-
pute mediation services and other forms of
technical assistance aimed at helping devel-
oping countries attract and retain foreign
private capital. As donor attention has
turned to private infrastructure projects,
MIGA has become more actively involved in
infrastructure programs, although its portfo-
lio of infrastructure-related guarantees was
relatively small at about $1.87 billion in
2005. The Guayaquil water project high-
lighted above accounted for $17.1 million of
those guarantees.29
Projects also tend to require substantial
technical assistance, and virtually all
development aid donors provide technical
assistance to client governments. Technical
assistance is often an integral part of a
donor’s financing program. However, the
type of technical assistance needed for
successful projects may in some cases differ
from the traditional engineering assistance
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typically provided by the Bank and other
donors. Such necessary assistance can take
the form of capacity building through
education and training or the provision of
direct support for specific functions such as
assistance with contract negotiations and
economic regulation.  
In 1999, the governments of Japan and the
United Kingdom, working with the World
Bank, created the Public-Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), “a
multidonor technical assistance facility aimed
at helping developing countries improve the
quality of their infrastructure through private
sector involvement.”30 PPIAF works closely
with the World Bank’s Infrastructure Action
Program. Its primary mission is to promote
best practices on private involvement in infra-
structure and to channel technical assistance
to developing countries’ governments on
strategies and measures for involving the 
private sector in infrastructure.
The social benefits and externalities pro-
vided by infrastructure projects usually justify
a public subsidy. Most projects are not finan-
cially self-sustaining; if they were, they would
easily attract private commercial capital.  In
the case of private infrastructure projects,
donors can target funds to fill a specific
financing gap or help the recipient govern-
ment to fashion an incentive contract to
ensure the delivery of specified outputs and
services. Subsidized services can be delivered
in various ways, for example through vouch-
ers to end users, by an initial grant to finance
the construction of a facility, or through out-
put-based aid that ties the payment of public
funds to the delivery of specified services, as
described earlier.  
20
LESSONS LEARNED
Private participation in infrastructure is an
important potential resource for developing
countries but it is not a panacea, and it is not
easy to carry out in a manner that yields posi-
tive results. Aid agencies are well aware of
both the promise and pitfalls of private infra-
structure projects. Project evaluations con-
clude that “well designed schemes can bring
about substantial increases in overall wel-
fare.”31 To obtain the benefits of private-sec-
tor involvement, public administrators need
to be able to create contracts that establish
the right incentives; they need to have the
capacity to monitor “milestones” and quality;
they need to set up well-functioning support-
ing institutions; and they need to transfer
enough commercial risk and responsibility to
the private sector. Transparency on the part
of public- and private-sector participants is a
particularly important part of the process
because it helps create public legitimacy and
thwart corruption. For its part, the private-sec-
tor participant will want to minimize political
risk and exposure to political interference.
Despite documented successes, private par-
ticipation has met some serious obstacles.
While completion rates for Bank-sponsored
private infrastructure projects overall are over
90 percent, some sectors have done less well.
Some observers suggest that 40 percent of
capital invested in water projects involving
private investors from 1990 to 2003 was for
projects the World Bank classifies as either
cancelled or distressed.* Thirteen percent of
spending on transport has also been in failed
projects.  
In many developing countries, public
support for private participation is low. The
Latinbarometer survey in 2001 found that 
63 percent of those surveyed in 17 countries
felt that private participation had not been
beneficial, while the same survey found only
45 percent had held this view three years
earlier.32 In some countries, observers have
complained that private infrastructure
projects have not appreciably improved the
provision of public services. In some cases,
private infrastructure contracts have created
new problems, such as the need for frequent
contract renegotiations. Seventy-five percent
of the water contracts drawn in the 1990s 
in Latin America were renegotiated, and 
74 percent of the transport concessions were
renegotiated. 
Digging deeper into efficiency issues, the
World Bank found that “in general, … [pri-
vate participation] has been associated with
improvements in efficiency, but only with or
through other reforms. … [The] more rele-
vant variables include the degree of competi-
tion, the design of regulation, the quality of
institutions and the degree of corruption.”
Meaningful competition and the transfer of
commercial risk to the private sector have
been associated with improvements from
private participation, but “governments have
to pay attention to the detailed design of
regulatory frameworks.”33
Private participation may complicate the
design of regulations, but in principle has
advantages. With a private provider, it should
be easier to enforce requirements and meet
non-financial targets. Because the agent
responsible for enforcing policies is better
separated from the provider, the provider
can be more easily replaced if performance
is not up to expectations. It should also be
easier to remove price subsidies, because
with a private-sector agency the subsidies
usually are explicit, while under a public
agency the subsidies are represented in
terms of the financial loss of the provider.
The key question facing public utilities in
the early 1990s was how to set prices so as to
both meet public needs for accessible, reli-
able service, and make the service financially* The Financing for Development Initiative of the World
Economic Forum 
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sustainable under a constrained budget.
Fifteen years later, the question of pricing is
still fundamental, but the problem has
changed from getting the price right to con-
structing the right financial incentives to
encourage productive private-sector engage-
ment. Fortunately, many lessons have been
learned on how this can be done in both
developed and developing countries. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The need for increased investment in infra-
structure in developing countries is obvious.
Equally obvious is that public provision of
infrastructure alone will not be adequate to do
the job. The private sector has much to offer,
in both human and financial resources, and
should be part of the solution to meeting the
infrastructure needs of developing countries.
Of the three entities involved in private
infrastructure projects (public, private, and
donors), the private sector seems, at this
time, to have both the strongest desire and
the least incentive to participate. At the end
of 2005, most observers agree that there is a
substantial potential supply of private-capital
seeking investment opportunities worldwide.
Many in the private sector, although aware of
potential for profits through such projects,
are wary due to the economic losses experi-
enced by some firms in the recent past.
Although many types of organizations oper-
ate in developing countries for humanitar-
ian reasons, profit-making firms need the
incentive of profit to induce investment.
Some developing country governments
understand the value of enlisting private
companies to design, build, and deliver infra-
structure services; and they have many candi-
date projects, including a large number of
existing state-owned enterprises that would
benefit from divestiture. Donors, too, see the
value in facilitating private infrastructure proj-
ects, but their bureaucratic processes and
long-standing mindsets often get in the way of
embracing innovative ways of “doing more.”  
Host-country governments and aid donors
must do more to overcome public resistance
and to entice private-sector participation by
explaining the benefits of foreign investment
in infrastructure, while also becoming more
effective and reliable “partners.”* “Doing
more” might encompass a greater use of
guarantees, escrow accounts, penalty clauses
or other financial mechanisms to reassure,
without completely indemnifying, private-sec-
tor companies. At the same time, developing-
country governments must, for a host of rea-
sons linked to development, redouble efforts
to establish and maintain sound and stable
economic policies and to eliminate corrup-
tion. Establishing more effective regulatory
regimes, property rights, and (judicial)
enforceability must be part of the process. In
the final analysis, the actions of developing-
country governments to establish and main-
tain credible policies are prerequisites to
attract private investment of all kinds. Among
the most important actions developing coun-
tries can take, in the context of infrastructure
investments, are:
• to be fully transparent about all aspects of
private infrastructure projects,
• to establish sound and equitable pricing
policies, and
• to devote sufficient talent and resources to
the development of private infrastructure
project contracts and regulation.
In addition to taking on a greater role in
facilitating private infrastructure projects,
donors also ought to look more closely at the
potential benefits of pooled-financing
arrangements. With appropriate donor
involvement, through partial guarantees and
technical assistance, pooled-financing
arrangements hold the promise of drawing in
additional private-sector capital. In addition,
by tapping into grass-roots demand for serv-
ices, such arrangements can overcome some
of the popular distrust that has marred some
projects and caused them to fail. Certainly,
the concept deserves further attention and
experimentation.
* The need to contend with negative public opinion about
foreign investment in infrastructure is not limited to develop-
ing countires.  Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana said, with
regard to the lack of public support for his state’s sale of a
major highway, “I should have done much more than I did to
walk Indiana through, in advance, both the business case and
the realities of today’s global competition.”  Op-Ed contribu-
tion, Mitch Daniels, “For Whom the Road Tolls,” The New York
Times, May 27, 2006.
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As one analyst has observed, “The legally
binding contracts and hard budget con-
straints introduced by private participation
flushed into the open problems that had
been hidden during the era of public provi-
sion. While some governments have not
been able to deal successfully with these,
these problems will not be solved by a rever-
sion to public provision.”34 Governments
that are truly seeking economic develop-
ment will have to address their infrastructure
needs, and the policies that have prevented
sufficient investment and provision of serv-
ices.  When they do, it is most likely that pri-
vate-sector participation with public support
will be an important element of the solution
to the infrastructure needs of the world’s
poorest countries. 
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For more than 60 years, the Committee
for Economic Development has been a
respected influence on the formation of
business and public policy. CED is devoted
to these two objectives: 
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommen-
dations for private and public policy that will
contribute to preserving and strengthening our
free society, achieving steady economic growth
at high employment and reasonably stable
prices, increasing productivity and living stan-
dards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving
the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding
by present and future leaders in business,
government, and education, and among
concerned citizens, of the importance of
these objectives and the ways in which they
can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private vol-
untary contributions from business and
industry, foundations, and individuals. It is
independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and
nonpolitical.  
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science
courses and in management training courses;
that will be considered and discussed by
newspaper and magazine editors, columnists,
and commentators; and that are distributed
abroad to promote better understanding of
the American economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their
concern for the general welfare, it is helping
business to earn and maintain the national
and community respect essential to the suc-
cessful functioning of the free enterprise
capitalist system.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent,
nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are com-
posed of business executives and scholars and have objectives similar to those of CED, which
they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with these organizations on
research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. This
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international
matters as energy, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariff barriers
to trade.
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